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Abstract
This article presents a computational semantics for classical logic using
constructive type theory. Such semantics seems prima facie impossi-
ble because classical logic allows the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM),
not accepted in constructive logic since it does not have computational
meaning. However, the apparently oracular powers expressed in the
LEM, that for any proposition P either it or its negation, ∼ P , is true
can also be explained in terms of constructive evidence that does not
refer to “oracles for truth.” Types with virtual evidence and the con-
structive impossibility of negative evidence provide sufficient semantic
grounds for classical truth and have a simple computational meaning.
This idea is formalized using refinement types, a concept of construc-
tive type theory used since 1984 and explained here. A new axiom
creating virtual evidence fully retains the constructive meaning of the
logical operators in classical contexts.
A key step in this approach is motivated by observations of the twenty
two old A. Kolmogorov who showed in 1924/25 how to translate clas-
sical propositional logic into constructive propositional logic by using
∼∼ P in place of P . His method is explained here. It was extended
by Kuroda to first order logic and modified by Go¨del for number the-
ory. That method and its modifications do not provide a new semantic
account of classical logic, rather they rely on syntactically translating
classical propositions to constructive ones. The new idea proposed here
is to define virtual constructive evidence for classical propositions using
the refinement type of computational type theory to specify the classi-
cal computational content. The following refinement type, {Unit|P},
is critical. Its only element is the unique element ⋆ of Unit, provided
P is known, otherwise it is the empty type. If P is known by con-
structive evidence p, then the refinement type has ⋆ as its only explicit
element, and p is hidden implicit evidence. We imagine that p has been
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“squashed” to ⋆, and we call {Unit|P} “squashed P .”
The new axiom, ∼∼ P ⇒ {Unit|P}, creates virtual evidence for P.
That evidence can be used to construct virtual evidence in other re-
finement types by following the standard rules for them. There is
constructive evidence for ∼∼ P but only virtual evidence for P. We
abbreviate {Unit|P} to {P}, so the new axiom is simply ∼∼ P ⇒ {P}.
This axiom, called here Classical Introduction, is similar to the law of
Double Negation Elimination (DNE) favored by Kolmogorov to ax-
iomatize classical logic as an extension of constructive logic. If there
is only constructive evidence for ∼∼ P, and none known for P, then
there is only virtual evidence for {P} that is also hidden and can be un-
hidden only when proving classical propositions. Virtual constructive
evidence carries more information than is provided by standard classi-
cal semantics. This new semantics integrates classical and constructive
logic and is possible because constructive type theory expresses more
kinds of evidence than classical set theory.
Key Words: classical logic, constructive logic, intuitionistic logic,
propositions-as-types, constructive type theory, refinement types, dou-
ble negation translation, computational content, virtual evidence
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1 Introduction
Constructive logic is important in computer science for several reasons.
One of them is that proof assistants for constructive type theory are widely
used in formal methods, software development, and as programming
assistants for dependently typed programming languages.1 Another is that
constructive logics support the correct-by-construction and
secure-by-construction programming methods. Furthermore,
computational type theory appears to be an appropriate foundation for
computer science because computation is essential to the theory. The
computational content of propositions and proofs is given by computable
operations and discrete data. Also the origins of computer science as a
discipline have deep roots in the investigations of the foundations of
mathematics. Indeed, computer science has created technologies that draw
on Hilbert’s formalism, Brouwer’s intuitionism, and Russell’s type theory.
The central ideas of computability and unsolvability from Church, Turing,
and Kleene lie at the heart of both computer science and constructive logic.
In this context it is important to understand more completely the
relationship between classical logic and constructive logic. A great deal is
known about the relationship between these two kinds of logic from the
seminal work of Kolmogorov [41, 19], Glivenko [26], Go¨del [27, 28], Kuroda
[44], Kleene [39], Friedman [23] and others who will be mentioned here.2 In
addition results about typing programming language control operators
[31, 47, 25] reveal interesting connections to classical logic, e.g. that some
control operators have classical typing. These results (except for Kleene’s)
are based on proof theory which is by nature concerned with details of
specific proof systems and axioms. Proof theory ties the work to particular
axioms, inference rules, and deduction systems. In contrast, the account
given here is semantic. It can be formalized in all proof systems of various
styles, from the Hilbert style and the Gentzen styles [24] (Natural
Deduction and Sequent Calculus – either standard bottom up or top down
as in LCF based systems [29]) to the Beth Semantic Tableaux [53, 22].
Semantic approaches are less dependent on the details of axioms and
1As a consequence, they can express refinement types, quotient types, intersection
types, partial types, and rich recursive and co-recursive types.
2For an English translation of Kolmogorov’s 1924 article see [60], for very informative
comments about it see Uspensky [58]. The cited Go¨del article is an English translation
of a four page 1933 article. This approach might be abbreviated as the KGKG (Kol-
mogorov,Glivenko,Kuroda,Go¨del) approach, or (KG)2.
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inference rules, and they are used to justify and explain formal
presentations of the rules. The semantic approach was used by Allen [2] to
validate the rules of constructive type theory implemented by Nuprl. This
method was formalized in Coq by Anand and Rahli [3]. Semantic methods
typically require a richly expressive metatheory such as set theory for
classical logics and type theory for constructive ones. The expressive
richness of type theory with dependent types is critical to the semantic
nature of these new results and methods. Semantic approaches have been
used to justify a classical subset of the constructive type theory CTT14
implemented by Nuprl, (see Howe [38]), and a classical version of the
calculus of inductive constructions implemented by Coq [6] is justified by
proof theoretical results. It is not clear whether the Coq approach
currently supports mixed mode assertions of the kind illustrated later in
this article.
This article is an introduction to a semantic approach based on virtual
evidence. We can achieve a complete understanding of this method in the
case of propositional logic, proving that the new rule used here is
consistent and complete for this classical logic. We have a good
understanding for first-order logic as well where consistency is guaranteed
and there are forms of completeness as well. For Peano Arithmetic (PA)
the situation is more subtle with respect to Heyting arithemitc (HA),
which can express undecidability and incompleteness.
For type theory as a whole, many interesting questions arise. For example,
the new semantics supports a wide variety of mixed mode assertions,
blending constructive and classical, as illustrated later in the article. At
this level of conceptual richness, interesting questions arise about
integrating classical logic in a natural way. We can imagine results that
would engage the mathematical community widely.
1.1 Summary of the constructive semantics of classical logic
In a sense, mathematics has been constructive since Euclid, and so called
“classical mathematics” is a 19th century trend. There are topics in
modern mainstream mathematics that have always been constructive.
Also, given a choice, mathematicians generally favor constructive proofs.
Edwards [21] gives a modern look at this constructive line as does Henrici
[32] and other articles too numerous to mention. Intuitionistic
mathematics is an approach to constructive mathematics developed by
L.E.J. Brouwer starting with his doctoral thesis in 1907 and developed
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over his lifetime in a series of deeply novel and fundamental mathematical
results [33, 61, 59].3 Moreover, Kolmogorov suggested a unification of
intuitionistic and classical logics based on his double negation embedding of
classical logics into intuitionistic ones. Glivenko [26] proved they were
equally expressive for propositional logic, and Kuroda [44] extended the
result to first-order logic. Murthy [47] implemented this Kolmogorov
embedding in Nuprl and used it in his automated formal transformation of
a classical proof of Higman’s Lemma into a constructive proof.
Kolmogorov’s approach would also allow mixing of classical and
constructive logic. This is accomplished here as well based on the intuitive
computational semantics we provide for classical logic.
In his article about Kolmogorov’s work [19], Drago explores the use of
doubly negated sentences (DNS) to give a constructive meaning to results
in scientific papers. He shows that many scientific claims have the form of
a DNS.4 This article provides a semantic explanation for these results
using concepts from constructive type theory that were not available until
the 1980’s.
The Key Idea The new idea presented here involves two steps. The
first step is to hide (or suppress) the evidence for a proposition P using
the refinement type. The classical meaning of P is based on the
constructive refinement type {Unit|P} where Unit is the type with
precisely one element, ⋆. To know {Unit|P} constructively, one needs to
know evidence p for P , but it is not included with the evidence type. Only
⋆ is an element of this type when it is non empty. The evidence p is virtual
in this setting. We also call this refinement type squashed P. It is clear
that there is evidence for P ⇒ {Unit|P}, so we know this implication
constructively. However, we do not know {Unit|P} ⇒ P in general
because we are only assuming that there is evidence for P , and even if we
had known evidence for P and hidden it, to prove this proposition, we
would need to reconstruct that evidence. Clearly we do not have evidence
for {Unit|P ∨ ∼ P} ⇒ (P ∨ ∼ P ) for all propositions P .
Another way to explain the meaning of the refinement type {Unit|P} is in
3Brouwer called his work modern mathematics, see [59]. Kolmogorov appears to
have been the first logician to axiomatize Brouwer’s ideas for intuitionistic mathemat-
ics. Brouwer is also considered one of the founders of topology and is well known for his
classical fixed point theorems.
4My colleague Mark Bickford and I have found similar applications in understanding
statements about distributed systems [7].
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terms of a general refinement type of the form {x : A|B(x)}, which consists
of those elements a of type A such that evidence b for B(a) is known. Thus
an element belongs to {Unit|P} if and only if it belongs to Unit and
evidence p for P is known. So if constructive evidence p for P is known,
then ⋆ belongs to {Unit|P}. One can interpret this type as “squashing”
the evidence p which might be complex, down to a single point, ⋆. The
constructive details are hidden, but this can only be done once evidence is
known in the first place or built up from assumptions that have this
classical character. This “hiding operation” was introduced in
“Constructive Mathematics as a Programming Logic I: Some Principles of
Theory” [14] and used extensively since. This step does not take us beyond
constructive logic, but it introduces the idea that there is a type that is
designed to hide evidence. Now we look at properties of this type in
preparation for the second step.
If we know ∼ P constructively, then we know that {Unit|P} is definitely
empty – there is nothing to hide. When we know constructively that there
is no evidence for ∼ P , then we know that {Unit| ∼∼ P} cannot be empty.
We also know that it can have only one possible unhidden element, namely
⋆. Inspired by Kolmogorov’s observation that the classical axiom for
Double Negation Elimination, ∼∼ P ⇒ P , gives us full classical logic, we
ponder whether we can make constructive sense of the idea that
∼∼ P ⇒ {Unit|P}. If we don’t actually have evidence for P , so we can’t
constructively inhabit the type {Unit|P}. To do so requires evidence for P ,
even though once we have that evidence, we hide it.5 We call this hidden
evidence virtual because we can use {Unit|P} as if we had evidence for P
when we are trying to prove other refinement types. That is how the
refinement rules work.
For classical reasoning, constructive evidence for P is not required.
Classical reasoners are contemplating the possibility that there might be
evidence available in ways yet unknown. Perhaps an Omniscient Assistant
(OA) knows convincing evidence. Once a deeper understanding is achieved
using virtual evidence, it might be possible to find constructive evidence.
This has often happened in the past.
In light of the above observations, the second step is adding the following
new axiom of Classical Introduction (CI):
∼∼ P ⇒ {Unit|P}.
5In proof assistants such as Nuprl and MetaPRL, the evidence can be found in the
proof object, but it is not part of the refinement type.
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The required constructive evidence to know that ⋆ belongs to this type is
knowing specific evidence p for P .6 We might not have such evidence since
we only assume we know ∼∼ P . In particular, we do not have it when we
consider ∼∼ (P ∨ ∼ P )⇒ {Unit|(P ∨ ∼ P )} even though we have
constructive evidence for ∼∼ (P ∨ ∼ P ).
Our proposal is to forego including evidence for P when realizing the new
axiom ∼∼ P ⇒ {Unit|P}. This step agrees with the classical notion that
evidence is not required for axioms. It agrees with the constructive notion
that axioms should be realizable in that the constant function whose value
is ⋆ is an adequate realizer for the only evidence that must be visible. The
missing evidence is not carried along with the type, and when the type
occurs in assumptions, only the virtual evidence is available. That virtual
constructive evidence is all that is necessary for classical reasoning. The
only explicit evidence needed for computation is ⋆. Since constructively
{Unit|P} can not be empty, and since it can only have ⋆ as a member, this
must be the member. So this axiom is constructive in the sense that we
have not lost the required computational meaning of the type.
To recapitulate, if there is constructive evidence for ∼∼ P , call it nnp,
then we can provide a function to give us the accessible evidence for
{Unit|P}, namely ⋆. That is all we are allowed to use constructively from
the type. The constant function whose value is ⋆ is the realizer for this
axiom. There is no loss of classical content when we make this positive
assertion that we have trivial evidence ⋆ for P . Thus we can provide
computational evidence for the implication ∼∼ P ⇒ {Unit|P}, that is,
evidence for ∼∼ P ⇒ {P}. With this new axiom we can prove:
{Unit|P} ⇔∼∼ P.
The Classical Introduction axiom reveals the essential difference in
evidence requirements between classical and constructive logic, and it
allows us to conduct classical reasoning with refinement types in a way
that can be explained constructively without assuming that we have an
oracle that can provide enough evidence to justify the proposition
constructively, yet can provide computational evidence that is sufficient for
classical reasoning. By mixing the classical and constructive modes, we
allow a natural style of classical reasoning that supports extracting
programs from proofs with some classical steps.
In this context, one way of understanding {P} is that by proving this
6We might also want to name this Constructive DNE.
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squashed proposition, one knows that it is classically consistent. In some
cases there is constructive evidence in hand for P . In other cases the
constructive status of P might be entirely unknown, yet to be discovered
or perhaps forgotten or only a partly scribbled note in the margin or
perhaps evidence known only to an Omniscient Assistant that might be
revealed one day or even discovered by a proof assistant that knows {P}
and is set the goal to keep looking for a proof of P . In any case,
establishing {P}, raises the possibility of the stronger result P . Many
constructive results have been discovered by exploiting this possibility.
What we also know is that the classical reasoning mode is semantically
consistent with constructive reasoning. This will not be proved here. It
can be established in the semantic model of CTT and could thus be
formally proved in Coq.
1.2 Markov’s Principle
In the CTT14 type theory, the identity propositions, a = a in A, have ⋆ as
a realizer.7 This is also the CTT84 method of asserting that a has type A,
that is a ∈ A. The equality rules extend this interpretation to all equality
types, a = b in A. We do not extend the classical modality to these
equality types because we know from the work of Kopylov and Nogin [43]
that this will lead to a justification of Markov’s Principle (MP), which we
do not regard as established by the arguments given here. This limitation
of squashing is justified by the fact that we can in principle provide the
equality evidence with the equality types, and there is explanatory value in
doing that and using the squashing only as an efficiency step.
For people who would like to use classical reasoning to establish
termination of computable functions, the methods of Kopylov and Nogin
just mentioned can be seen as a natural extension of the virtual approach.8
We propose using the classical modality for this extension.
This constructive semantics for classical logic is studied here only for
7Versions of constructive type theory are distinguished by writing CTT followed by the
date they were implemented. Basically this theory has gotten progressively richer since
its first release in 1984, CTT84 implemented by Nuprl. These are sometimes referred to
collectively as the “Nuprl type theory” since all versions are implemented by Nuprl, and
they are upward compatible.
8There are indeed researchers in the Coq community who are seeking such methods in
a way that fits well with constructive type theory. They work well with Nuprl which has
the refinement type, not yet included in the Coq type theory, the Calculus of Inductive
Constructions (CIC) [6].
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First-Order Logic (FOL). That it applies far more generally is clear –
indeed for all of constructive type theory. In that broad context, there are
many interesting questions. The key principle involved has been used in
constructive type theory for other purposes and is called “squashing”
computational content. It could be that we have collectively known all
along that classical reasoning in the great preponderance of cases is not far
removed from constructive reasoning. The apparently stronger classical
assertions are the result of requiring weaker evidence for them than one
expects for their constructive counterparts. Interestingly, the standard
classical evidence given via set theory is inadequate for recovering the
constructive substructure of classical logic. There is a sense in which type
theory is a more suitable foundation for “modern mathematics” than set
theory.
1.3 Comparing constructive and classical logic
Many people believe that constructive logic is simply a subsystem of
classical logic that does not use LEM. This is misleading even for
First-Order Logic (FOL) and incorrect unless the classical logical system
uses all the logical operators, &,∨,⇒,∀,∃, and False as primitives.9 The
fundamental way in which this is the wrong view is that the constructive
meaning of the logical operators is different from their classical meaning.
The constructive meaning is given in terms of evidence and computation
which are entirely missing from the semantics of classical logic. One of the
main benefits of the approach used here is that it retains the constructive
meaning of the logical operators, unlike in Go¨del’s approach discussed later.
Constructive semantics expresses logical concepts in terms of mental
constructions and basic computational operations of mathematics. In the
case of minimal logic, the semantics is completely unassailable and
essentially universally accepted. Minimal logic does not have the rule ex
falso quodlibet : from False anything follows. That rule can be expressed
as False⇒ P. 10 Moreover, for minimal first-order logic, mFOL, we know
that the standard proof rules are complete with respect to the intended
interpretation of the logic, and that the completeness result is itself
constructive [13].
On the other hand, when people are asked about why they believe classical
logic, they typically talk about the fact that the logical rules are
9The negation of P , ∼ P, is defined as P ⇒ False.
10It is said that Brouwer did not use this rule in his intuitionistic mathematics.
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“obviously true.” Few people discuss “Platonic reality.” In the discussions
with my Cornell computer science colleagues that prompted this
investigation, some of them said, “well, I can’t imagine that P ∨ ∼ P
could be false.” In this view, they are entirely consistent with constructive
mathematics. The problem with Platonic reality expressed in set theory is
that naive mathematical truth is not at all clear and evident to everyone,
and the formal accounts by Tarksi [56] and the standard textbooks that
rely on either axiomatic or intuitive set theory already rely on classical
logic with LEM [4, 51, 53, 11]! These theories do not make constructive
sense even though FOL does.11 Moreover, many basic questions about
“the Platonic reality of sets” have defied our efforts to clarify them.
Perhaps we might have a better chance of seeing this reality in terms of
types, as Church thought we might.12
In this article we will see a computational explanation of the classical laws
of logic, and we can account for what people might mean when they
believe that (P ∨ ∼ P ) is obviously true. What they often say when asked
to defend this axiom is that for every well defined proposition P , it is not
possible to imagine any deeper explanation of LEM – it is just “obvious”
and hence axiomatic. But it is far from universally obvious. So one
approach is to simply say the following: we cannot imagine that
∼ (P∨ ∼ P ) could ever be true since accepting that would require us to
exhibit a proposition P which we know to be unknowable. We cannot
imagine how this would be done. Indeed, we constructively know that it
cannot be done. Brouwer gave the following (unpublished) fully
constructive argument for ∼∼ (P ∨ ∼ P ) which is reported on page 26 of
Van Atten’s small 2004 book On Brouwer [59]:
“Can one ever prove of a proposition, that it can never be decided? No,
because one would have to do so by reductio ad absurdum. So one would
have to say: assume that the proposition has been decided in sense X, and
from that deduce a contradiction. But then it would have been proved
that not X is decided after all.”
Here is a version of this informal argument that we create using
constructive proof rules. To prove ∼∼ (P ∨ ∼ P ), we need to assume
∼ (P ∨ ∼ P ) and prove a contradiction, e.g. prove False. (This is Brouwer
saying “we need to use reduction ad absurdum.”) Our assumption is
11Aczel [1] shows how to define a version of set theory in intuitionistic type theory, but
not full ZFC set theory. Hickey implemented Aczel’s approach in MetaPRL [35].
12For example, it is easy to see in CTT that a constructive continuum hypothesis is
false.
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hyp1 : (P ∨ ∼ P )⇒ False. So we can prove False if we can prove
(P ∨ ∼ P ), so we take this as a goal, and chose to prove the ∼ P disjunct,
the one on the right hand side of ∨. Thus our subgoal is to assume P and
prove False. (This is Brouwer saying, assume we decide to prove P and
discover a contradiction.) We now have two assumptions in play,
hyp1 : (P ∨ ∼ P ) and hyp2 : P . We have two nested subgoals, both are to
prove False. Now to prove the second (deepest) False we use hyp1 a
second time, again creating the subgoal to prove (P ∨ ∼ P ), but this time
we chose to prove the left disjunct, P. This is a good choice, because we
have exactly this as our second hypothesis, so we are done. (Brouwer does
not bother with these details, he notices that by proving ∼ P we have done
the task we set ourselves and thus are done.)
We can present this argument symbolically after we define the sense of the
constructive logical operators. This argument leads us to examine how one
might justify LEM. We have seen that it is impossible that we cannot
decide any specific proposition, say X. We cannot prove that X is
unknowable. If that is the case, then for every X it must be possible to
come to know it or its denial. This insight of Brouwer’s is one of the most
compelling reasons to believe ∼∼ (P ∨ ∼ P ).
We will see that this insight leads us to a plausible constructive
explanation for (P ∨ ∼ P ). The explanations are in terms of how we come
to believe mathematical claims by finding evidence either for or against
them. This evidence must lead to a mental experience enabled by our
ability to make mental constructions and carry out computations on
representations of mathematical objects.
1.4 Consistency and completeness
We can easily show that if {G} is provable in iPC, then G is provable in
PC. This shows that the semantic approach is consistent. The proof is by
induction on the (top down) sequent proof tree. The key steps are
justifying the Classical Intro rule and the unfolding rule for the refinement
type. We have discussed both of these already.
iPC Consistency Theorem: If ⊢iPC {G} then ⊢PC G.
We can also show that the method is complete in the sense that we can
prove any result of the classical propositional calculus.
iPC Completeness Theorem: If ⊢PC G, then ⊢{iPC} {G}.
This proof is very simple. We only need to replace the rule of double
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negation elimination, all of the other rules are constructive. We do that by
invoking the Classical Introduction rule.
It is also relatively easy to prove a consistency theorem for iFOL, but the
issue of completeness is complicated by wanting to find the most general
fact to capture in a theorem. We cannot use the principle
∼∼ ∀x.(P (x) ∨ ∼ P (x))⇒ {∀x.(P (x) ∨ ∼ P (x))}
because ∼∼ ∀x.(P (x) ∨ ∼ P (x)) is not constructively valid. It can easily
be seen that it is not uniformly valid, and thus by the completeness
theorem for this concept, it is not provable in iFOL, see [13]. We need to
settle for justifying ∀x.{P (x) ∨ ∼ P (x)}, which is valid and seems
sufficient. We do not pursue the completeness issue in this article.
iFOL Consistency Theorem: If ⊢{iFOL} {G} then ⊢FOL G.
For arithmetic, the classical theory of Peano Arithmetic (PA) is
inconsistent with constructive arithmetic, Heyting Arithmetic (HA),
because in HA there are unsolvable problems, for instance, the halting of
the i-th partial recursive function, say φi on its own index, Halt(φi(i)) is
undecidable. Kleene [39] discusses this issue.
Classical Incompatibility Theorem:
⊢HA ∼ (∀i : N.(Halt(φi(i)) ∨ ∼ Halt(φi(i))), and
⊢PA ∀i : N.(Halt(φi(i)) ∨ ∼ Halt(φi(i))).
The obvious adjustment for both FOL and PA is to restrict the scope of
the universal quantifier. The classical claim can be expressed as
Classical Solvability Theorem:
⊢{iPA} ∀n : N.{Halt(φn(n)) ∨ ∼ Halt(φn(n))}.
Go¨del provided a general translation of classical number theory into
intuitionistic number theory by giving a translation of classical
propositions into constructive ones that do not mention disjunction or the
existential quantifier. His translation is given below where P are atomic
propositions, and A and B are arbitrary propositions of Peano Arithmetic.
1. Given atomic proposition, P let P o be P.
2. (A⇒ B)o is (Ao ⇒ Bo).
3. (A&B)o is (Ao&Bo).
4. (A ∨B)o is ∼ (∼ Ao& ∼ Bo).
12
5. (∼ A)o is ∼ Ao.
6. (∀x.A(x))o is ∀x.Ao(x).
7. (∃x.A(x))o is ∼ ∀x. ∼ Ao(x).
Notice that the translated formulas do not express propositions using either
the constructive ∨ (or operator) nor the constructive existential quantifier,
∃x. These are among the most interesting logical operators since they
express our ability to make decisions and construct objects. In classical
logic, we give up on those modes of expression and thus lose a great deal of
the computational meaning expressible in constructive logic. In our
approach, the constructive meaning of the logical operators is preserved.
Given a list of labeled formulas H as hypotheses, let Ho be the list with
each formula translated. We know this result.
Go¨del Translation Theorem: If H ⊢ G, then Ho ⊢ Go.
2 Propositions-as-types semantics
In this section we briefly define the intended constructive interpretation of
the logical operators, using the propositions-as-types principle. We express
the principle in constructive type theory. We begin with a brief historical
sketch putting this semantics in context and relating it to other variants of
the idea.
2.1 Historical context
The central concept in logic is usually taken to be propositions, and the
central questions are how do we understand them, i.e. grasp their sense,
and how can we know them. The classical approach to knowledge is to
define truth with respect to an ideal mathematical universe described in
set theory. Tarski [56] is most associated with this idea, and it gives rise to
model theory [10], a branch of modern logic.
The constructive approach to truth is to understand how knowledge is
represented in logic and how we formalize it. These are central questions in
philosophy, and there are many approaches to clarifying them. We take an
approach informed by a philosophical analysis provided by logicians,
mathematicians and philosophers. Martin-Lo¨f [45] and Tait [55] provide
compact summaries and Dummett [20] a longer one. There is a vast
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literature on the subject. The summary here is based on my enthusiasm
for the idea that constructive mathematics is concerned with finding
evidence that leads us to believe a proposition whose sense we grasp. At
one end of the spectrum of evidence is the notion of a formal proof, and
idea developed in depth by Hilbert [36] and his school. At the other end is
the notion of mental constructions and our intuitions about numbers and
time studied by intuitionists such as Brouwer [61].
The semantics of constructive/intuitionistic logic in the spirit of Brouwer
can be given using the propositions as types principle, an idea with many
variants and going by several other names. It can be used for classical logic
as well. It is employed here and defined below. Brouwer started developing
this style of semantics informally by 1907 [33]. Kolmogorov axiomatized
the propositional calculus in 1924 [41, 42], and then it became possible to
provide a semantics account of the axioms. Heyting axiomatized first-order
logic by 1935 [34]. Kleene provided a semantic account based on partial
recursive functions and called it realizability [40]. Curry [17] understood
the propositions as types semantics for propositional reasoning, and
Howard [37] extended Curry’s approach to give us the Curry-Howard
isomorphism [54]. De Bruijn saw that propositions as types had a classical
meaning as well [18, 48], and the author employed it to provide a
semantics of evidence for classical logic [15]. Martin-Lo¨f used the idea in
his various type theories [46].
The author and his colleagues used this constructive semantics to develop
a programming logic/language [5] and a constructive type theory (CTT84)
implemented by Nuprl [16]. That work led to one of the slogans that
summarizes the idea, namely proofs-as-programs and programs-as-proofs.
Cordell Green [30] also recognized the value of this idea early on and
developed software for correct-by-construction programming [52]. The
constructive type theory has steadily evolved to the current version,
CTT14, which has been formalized by Anand and Rahli [3] in the calculus
of inductive constructions (CIC) implemented by Coq [6]. 13
The key idea is that the meaning of a proposition, say P , is given by a
type whose elements can be understood as evidence for knowing P . It
must be evidence that people and machines can produce, check,
manipulate, communicate, and thus people can also experience. If
expression P has the syntactic form of a proposition, then we denote by
13CIC is a related constructive type theory, but it does not support the refinement type
used for our classical semantics. There is likely a way to accomplish the same ends in the
CIC constructive type theory.
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[P ] the type of evidence for P . Next we examine the key concepts for
understanding first-order propositions. The semantic prerequisite for
knowing that a concept is a proposition is knowing what constitutes
evidence for believing it. Each clause below explains that evidence
precisely for the standard logical operators.
2.2 The meaning of propositions
The syntax of propositions will be the same as presented in classical logic
and already briefly discussed above. The classical meaning of propositions
is given in terms of the truth values in the type of Booleans B, say tt and
ff . This makes it especially easy to say what atomic propositions True
and False mean classically, namely they denote their corresponding truth
values. It is also easy to say what a propositional variable such as P , Q, R,
etc. mean. Their meaning is given by an environment that maps these
variables into the Booleans, B.
The constructive meaning of propositions is quite different. We have
already seen that False is defined as the empty type, and True is
identified with a singleton type such as Unit. What about compound
propositions? Their meaning is given by other types. To understand them,
we need to first understand types. We will rely on an intuitive account of
types described as we go. In addition one needs a basic understanding
about computable functions when we discuss implication, ⇒, and universal
quantification, ∀. This semantics also relies on understanding data and
how computers process it. Understanding data is critical when we look at
concrete theories such as arithmetic, where the data are natural numbers.
In this realm the difference between constructive logic and classical logic is
pronounced, and the two views are in conflict. Nevertheless, we can
integrate them with this semantics.
• Atomic propositions: If a propositional expression has no internal
structure, expressed only by simple constants, as in True, False then
it is atomic. We cannot use its structure to tell us what it means.
For our purposes, the only propositional constants we single out are
these two. We also assume an unbounded number of atomic
propositions denoted by A,B,C, P,Q,R and so forth. As we discuss
specific areas of mathematics, we will see compound propositions
such as ∀n : N.∃m : N.n < m, and we might abbreviate them by a
letter such as S0 since their structure is atomic relative to the logical
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operators we are investigating.
We already see in the simple case of atomic expressions that we need
to acquire certain general concepts for explaining how we understand
propositions. Among those is the idea of a collection of evidence,
called a type. We assume this idea in the metatheory. In addition is
the idea of a correspondence between syntax and its meaning given
by the mapping from a propositional expression to a type, denoted
by [ ].
• Conjunction: Perhaps the simplest compound proposition to
understand is the conjunction, in English, “P and Q,” and
symbolically either P&Q or P ∧Q. Here we will use the & sign for
conjunction. If the evidence type for P is [P ] and for Q is [Q], then
the evidence type for P&Q is the Cartesian product [P ]× [Q]
consisting of the ordered pairs < p, q >, where p is in the type [P ],
and q is in the type [Q]. This is very intuitive.
To know a conjunction, we need evidence for each conjunct collected
together and associated with the conjunction so that we know which
evidence is assigned to which proposition. Notice that here we have
used the concept of ordered pairs. So our type theory must have the
notion of a Cartesian product, a standard name for the type of
ordered pairs. This is a semantically primitive concept that people
must grasp intuitively and machines must implement in order to
process evidence. We know that people can do this, and we built
machines this way. Our primitive mental apparatus reveals this
concept to be something that all people understand.14
• Disjunction: The next most complex logical construct is the
disjunction, “P or Q,” symbolically, P ∨Q. Evidence for this kind of
proposition must tell us two things: for which disjunct, P or Q, do
we have evidence; and what is that evidence. To accomplish the first,
we use a tag on the evidence. It could be a tag such as “left” for the
P disjunct and “right” for Q. Instead we use notation that has
become standard, inl and inr standing for “inject into the left side”
and “inject into the right side.” The objects being injected are the
evidence for the proposition selected, say inl(p) for P and inr(q) for
14Brouwer analyzed the primitive concepts needed to understand mathematics. He
believed that time is the fundamental concept humans understand, and that the separation
of time into two distinct moments gives rise to the notion of “twoity.” We see that this
idea is used here to understand conjunction.
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Q. The type of this kind of evidence is called a disjoint union type,
and it is denoted [P ] + [Q].15
• Implication: Implication is associated with our ability to compute,
to take evidence in one form and convert it to evidence in another
form. This ability is one of our mental tools for making
constructions. From this ability we come to understand an important
constructive type, the type of effective operations taking evidence of
type S and converting it to evidence of type T. We denote this type
of all the effective operations from type [S] to type [T ] as [S]→ [T ].
We will use the lambda calculus notation for effective operations.16
But first we offer a simpler notation familiar from any mathematics
course, using a function name such as f and writing an equation to
define it, such as f(x) = x for the identity function, f(x) = 0 for a
constant function, add(< x, y >) = x+ y for addition, and so forth.
Let f denote a computable operation from the type [S] to the type
[T ]; we write f : [S → T ] to say this succinctly. We could also use the
term “function” for this f , and we will discuss terminology later in
more detail. We stipulate that f makes sense on inputs s of type S
in that it computes to a specific value, denoted f(s) of type [T ].
When we define specific functions, such as the identity function, id,
that has the property that id(x) = x, we will use the well known
lambda notation, λ(x.t(x)), to define an operation from type [S] to
type [T ]. Given any evidence s in type [S], then the expression t(s),
where evidence s is substituted for the variable x in the expression
t(x), computes to (or reduces to) evidence in type [T ]. In this
notation, the identity function is λ(x.x).
If P and Q are propositions, then so is the implication P ⇒ Q.
Evidence for implication is an effective operation λ(x.q(x)) such that
given any evidence p of type [P ], q(p) reduces to evidence of type [Q].
• Domains of Discourse and Types: Most of our mathematical
discourse and our computer programs refer to particular kinds of
data or elements. Logicians and philosophers call this the domain of
discourse, and use D to denote it. Programming languages classify
15This notion is the dual of “twoity,” and the human mind grasps this duality as a
general concept for how twoity can be used, either to combine or to separate.
16This notation for operations is due to Church [12] who simplified the type theory of
Russell and of Russell and Whitehead in Principia Mathematica [50, 62].
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objects by their types, and we think of D as one of these “data
types.”
In classical discourse, D is usually any non-empty set. In
constructive discourse, it is any type, including possibly empty types.
In this article, we will be primarily interested in settings for which D
is well known and standard. However, we can express the notion that
a domain D can have virtual elements by using {D}. We have
already seen the unit types, Unit and V oid. We will want to consider
numerical domains such as the type of natural numbers, N, integers,
Z, rational numbers, Q, or real numbers, R.
To keep matters simple for comparison to classical logic, we will
assume that the domain of discourse, D, is non-empty and that we
know an element d of D. We will use V oid as discussed above and
the meaning of False.
• Propositional Functions: Once we have Type and a domain of
discourse, D in Type, our propositions are about elements of D.
They will be based on atomic propositional functions, also called
predicates or relations, which are computable functions from D into
Prop. For example, over the natural numbers N we might talk about
equality, n = m or order n < m. We define these as proposition
valued functions from the domain D to Prop. Since we treat
propositions as types, these are also functions from D to Type.
In constructive type theory, the way that we say that an element d
belongs to a type D is to assert d = d in D, abbreviated as d ∈ D.
The evidence for this claim is the trivial evidence ⋆ that we also use
for other atomic propositions such as True. We can adopt this
approach because every type D must come with an equality relation
on it, defining what it means for two elements of D to be equal.
• Existence: Saying that something exists having certain properties is
an important logical utterance. We write it as ∃x.P (x). The evidence
for this assertion is a pair, < d, p > where dǫD and p belongs to
[P (d)], i.e. pǫ[P (d)]. This makes sense because ∃x.P (x) is well
formed only when P has type D → Prop. Thus we know that P (d)
belongs to Prop since we have already established dǫD.
We see a dependency among the parts of this proposition and in the
evidence. The evidence for P (d) depends on d and the type of P.
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This is evidence for saying “we can construct an element d of D, such
that P (x).”
• Universality Claims: The most expressive claims in first-order
logic have the form that there is evidence that some property P or
relation R holds for all elements of a domain of discourse. We write
these as ∀x.P (x). The evidence here is quite substantial. It consists
of an effective operation f that takes any element d of D and
produces evidence in [P (d)], and this operation also respects the
equality relation on D so that it behaves as a function.17 That is, if
d1 = d2 in D, then f(d1) = f(d2) in [P (d1)]. We already know that
P (d1) is equal to P (d2) in Prop because P is a propositional
function, thus it respects equality on D.
2.3 Squashing computational content
The constructive type theory that we use to provide a rigorous semantics
includes the notion of a subset type, a.k.a. refinement type of the form
{x : T |P (x)} where T is a type and P is a propositional function over the
type T . This type was defined and explored in 1985 [14] and adopted in
the constructive type theory of the book Implementing Mathematics with
the Nuprl Proof Development System [16] in 1986. Its elements are the
members of the type T that satisfy the proposition P (x), but the evidence
for the proposition is hidden; it is not accessible from the type. The type
{Unit|P} has one element exactly when there is constructive evidence for
the proposition P . Let us agree that the element of Unit is ⋆. Then the
squashed type {Unit|P} has the element ⋆ when there is constructive
evidence for the proposition, and it is empty otherwise.
Definition: For a proposition P , let {P} be the corresponding squashed
proposition {Unit|P} where P has the constructive meaning as explained
above.
It is trivial to extend the logical operators to squashed propositions, e.g. to
consider these propositions:
{P}&{Q}, {P} ∨ {Q}, {P} ⇒ {Q},∃x.{P (x)},∀x.{P (x)}.
Notice that for {P ∨ ∼ P}, the squashed Law of Excluded Middle (LEM),
the type will be constructively empty if the proposition P is not decidable.
On the other hand, the type {∼∼ (P ∨ ∼ P )} is inhabited for any P by ⋆.
17In the CTT constructive type theory, we do not accept Church’s Thesis, so the effective
operations might go beyond the Turing computable functions.
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This is because we can prove the constructive fact ∼∼ (P ∨ ∼ P ). It has
quite interesting computational content which we will exhibit later. But
this is expected for constructive logic, and all we have done is hide the
computational content.
2.4 Double negation and virtual constructive evidence
Now we introduce a simple but powerful new notion associated with the
classical rule of logic favored by Kolmogorov and adopted by Kleene and
others to express classical logic by adding one new law to constructive
logic, the law of Double Negation Elimination (DNE).18
Double Negation Elimination: ∼∼ P ⇒ P .
In the constructive logic of squashed propositions, we have argued that
there is virtual evidence for ∼∼ P ⇒ {P}, and the function λ(f.⋆), is a
realizer.
We have noticed that ∼∼ (P ∨ ∼ P ) is constructively true and thus
{∼∼ (P∨ ∼ P )} is inhabited precisely by one and only one element, ⋆.
This means that the following proposition is virtually constructively true.
Theorem: ∀P : Prop.{P ∨ ∼ P}.
Proof : We know ∼∼ {P ∨ ∼ P} and ∼∼ {P} ⇒ {P}. Qed
Ideas similar to what is discussed here were used by Kopylov and Nogin in
their article “Markov’s Principle for Propositional Type Theory” [43].
They give an account of Markov’s Principle. They also suggest a
connection to classical logic that comes from a classical metatheory. Their
principle shows how to treat certain kinds of classical proofs as
constructive proofs. The relevant paragraph from their 2001 paper is
quoted here. I was an advisor on this paper, and we did not realize at the
time the full implications of this idea of a squash modality, as we called
{P}, as applying to all classical logics and classical semantics. We
especially did not see adding the principle for weak constructive semantics.
We can make the interpretation of Double Negation Elimination (DNE)
virtually constructive because we use the virtual evidence only in proving
other propositions with the squashed modality, only for proving {P}.
Kopylov and Nogin also allow this kind of reasoning for proving equality
relations, and hence for proving the typing judgments of constructive type
theory. As they show, this allows them to assert that Markov’s Principle
18In Kleene’s Introduction to Metamathematics [39], this law is Rule 8, and the Wis-
consin logic students referred to it as “the dreaded Rule 8.”
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(MP) is actually constructive, but they do not frame their task this way.
They frame it in the context of a classical meta theory. That extends the
idea considerably beyond the approach taken here, but they provide a
plausible account of MP if we use the squashed modality. Using the
approach of this article, one could provide an even more plausible reason
that MP might be considered constructively true since there is no need for
a classical metatheory.
The main novelty in the approach of this article is that we use the squash
modality only in a limited way and with essentially constructive semantics.
Here is another interesting theorem.
Theorem: ∀P : Prop.{P} ⇒∼∼ P. Proof: We assume {P} and assume
∼ P with a goal of proving False.
Qed
For this goal we can unhide the squashed {P}.
2.5 Axioms for refinement types
The rules for refinement types in CTT are quite simple and clear. Here is
essentially the account given for CTT84 that explains the rules in CTT02,
which remain in CTT14. The idea is that to prove {x : A|B(x)} from a list
of hypotheses H, we need to specify an element a and prove in a subgoal
that it has type A. We then need to prove that this a satisfies the
predicate B(x). This is called the introduction rule. The rule format here
is in the top down sequent style where the subgoals of the rule come after
the goal and are generated from the goal and the rule name.
The decomposition rule tells us how to use a refinement type as an
hypothesis. The idea is that if our goal is to prove the formula G from the
hypotheses H,u : {x : A|B(x)},H ′, where H and H ′ are lists of
assumptions, then we open the refinement type to have access to the
element x of A that we have assumed to exist, and we use it to prove the
goal. But we do not have access to the proof of B(x) for this purpose
unless the goal is squashed.
• Refinement Introduction
H ⊢ {x : A|B(x)} by a
H ⊢ a ∈ A
H ⊢ B(a)
• Refinement Decomposition Normal Goal
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H,u : {x : A|B(x)},H ′ ⊢ G by open(u;x.slot)
H,x : A,H ′ ⊢ G by g(x) for slot
• Refinement Decomposition Squashed Goal
H,u : {x : A|B(x)},H ′ ⊢ {z : G|R(z)} by open(u;x, v.slot(x, v))
H,x : A, v : B(x),H ′ ⊢ G by g(x, v)
H,x : A, v : B(x),H ′ ⊢ R(g(x, v)) by r(x, v)
3 Classical Propositional Calculus with
Constructive Semantics
The propositional calculus, PC, is the normal starting point for the study
of formal logic. It provides the meaning and proof rules for propositions
whose structure can be analyzed using the standard logical connectives
such as and, or, implies, not – symbolically &,∨,⇒,∼. These are not the
only logical operators that we use in mathematics and computing. There
are operators such as exclusive-or, conditional-and, strong-and, and so
forth.
On the other hand, we typically use only two of these operators to define
all the others when we present PC. For example, authors typically use
&,∼ or ∨,∼ or ⇒,∼, and we could in fact use just one primitive such as
the Sheffer stroke, P |Q saying that P and Q are incompatible, i.e. not both
are true.19 In the case of the intuitionistic propositional calculus (iPC),
the basic logic operators are not definable one from another, and we need
the full complement, &,∨,⇒,∼ or &,∨,⇒, False.
Thus, one of the first “curiosities” we face in this endeavor is that to define
PC constructively, we need more primitives than just one or two, we need
at least five including the refinement type, {Unit|P}. On the other hand,
once we have defined all of the standard classical logical operators, we can
prove the classical reduction to just one operator.
Even more curiously, in the constructive case, we find that there are other
binary logical operators that are necessary to express computational type
constructors natural in programming, such as the intersection operator ∪
and notions of parallel or, ||, which we will not discuss here.
19Can we use the Sheffer stroke P |Q (P and Q are incompatible, i.e. at most one of
them is true) or the joint denial, P ↓ Q (both P and Q are false) to axiomatize PC with
exactly one connective – these are the only two single operator possibilities according to
Smullyan [53], p.14 Exercise 5.
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It is an interesting question whether there is some finite collection of
“logical connectives” that will suffice for all we want to say. But it is a fact
that all logic books and implemented logics use these basic operators.
Therefore we start with them, in particular with the logical operation that
is constructively most interesting: implication.
Implication is also used in these notes to define negation. To say “not P”
for a proposition P, we say that “P implies false”, symbolically,
P ⇒ False. We will study this notion in our first logical system, minimal
logic, by first including a constant with no special properties, denoted ⊥.
Then when we are ready to introduce negation, we will specify that ⊥ shall
be interpreted as False and negation, ∼ P shall be defined as P ⇒ False.
We will see many advantages to this approach, one of them being that we
can give a computational explanation to negation.
3.1 Logical Formulas
We will start with a subsystem called the minimal implicational calculus.
It is included in every version of Propositional Calculus. This calculus has
precisely one propositional constant, ⊥, exactly one logical operator, ⇒,
for implication, and an unbounded list of propositional variables whose
official representation is var{char} where char is a character string. For
example, variable could be var{X}, var{Y }, var{Unknown}, and so
forth. Normally we will write these more simply as A, B, C, P , Q, R, X,
Y , etc. We sometimes denote this simple calculus as PC[⊥,⇒].
The class Form of formulas of this calculus consists exactly of the objects
given by this inductive definition.
• the constant ⊥,
• variables var{char} for some character string in place of char,
• for F and G formulas, imp{F ;G} is a formula,
• nothing else is a formula.
Some of our explanations are simpler if we also include the constructive
disjunction, or{F ;G} as a formula. All the concepts below can be trivially
extended by including this clause.
This definition determines a class of objects, Form, whose elements we call
formulas. This is a typical example of an inductive definition. We say
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what the atomic elements are, ⊥ and var{char} (in this case an
unbounded number of them); and we say how to build new elements using
the constructor imp{A;B}. We stipulate that nothing else is a formula.
We can systematically generate all of the objects of the class. Here are
some examples listed out: ⊥, var{X}, imp{⊥;⊥},imp{var{X}; var{X}},
imp{var{X};⊥}.
It is common to display implications, e.g. imp{var{X};⊥}, in a more
readable way, such as X ⇒⊥. We call this the display form of the official
syntax for a term in the class Form. The official syntax is clear because
there is no question about the structure of the term. The outer operator of
every formula is either ⊥, var, or imp. Only the term whose outer
operator is imp has subterms. Specifically if the term in question is
imp{F ;G} for F and G formulas, then F and G are the left and right
subterms (subformulas) respectively.
It is immediately clear from the definition of formulas that they have a
unique structure, a unique way to read them. This is not true for the
display forms unless we disambiguate them, say using parentheses. For
instance, if we see A⇒ B ⇒ C, we do not know whether the formula is
imp{A; imp{B;C}} or imp{imp{A;B};C}. Thus we require that the
display form show the structure with explicit parentheses, e.g. the first
version displays as A⇒ (B ⇒ C), the second version as (A⇒ B)⇒ C.
In some presentations of propositions there is a convention that the ⇒
operator associates to the right, thus in these presentations, A⇒ B ⇒ C,
means A⇒ (B ⇒ C).
3.2 Operational Semantics
The idea of implication is something we understand as part of the naive
informal logic we use in the everyday world. We don’t often use the term
“implication” in informal discussion. Instead of saying A⇒ B is an
implication or that “proposition A implies proposition B,” we say “A
implies B” or we might say, “if A then B.” Usually when we say that A
implies B or B follows from A, we have some reason that we think we know
this. If someone says “if it’s snowing the temperature must be below
freezing”, they most likely know a reason for this, perhaps a bit of physics
or something they have always experienced. Some implications are the
result of piecing together bits of knowledge that constitute evidence for
why we believe the proposition. As we are learning basic arithmetic, we
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tend to memorize some atomic justifications for simple facts, e.g. −5×−5
is 25 remembering that “a minus times a minus is a plus” or some such
rule.
We might know a name for a reasoning step of the form A⇒ B implies
∼ B ⇒∼ A where we think, “if A implies B, then if not B, then not A.”
We will study this law of logic, called the contrapositive. Other forms of
inference were given names by the ancient logicians. These names served
as “evidence” for various assertions. Even some of the logical fallacies had
names such as “affirming the consequent” which is the claim that because
we know A⇒ B, and we know B, we must know A.
In general, when we make assertions such as “I know A” or “A is true” or
just A, we have in mind some reason that we believe A to be the case, we
can provide evidence for our claim. Perhaps for some simple assertions,
such as 0 = 0, we say: this is just what equality means, or it is trivial to
see this by comparing the symbols on each side of the equality sign, they
are identical. If we see 0 = (0× 1), then we might need to say a bit more,
such as, 0× 1 computes to 0 so this is the same as 0 = 0. In general what
we know here is that if we discover that some expression exp computes to
0, then we know 0 = exp.
What is the reason that we know A⇒ A in general and ⊥⇒⊥ in
particular? To answer this we need to know what implication, imp means.
What does A⇒ B mean in general? To know A⇒ B, we need to reason
from the assumption of A to the conclusion B, or from the antecedent to
the consequent. Thinking in terms of evidence we see intuitively and
naively that we know the implication holds if we have a method of
transforming evidence for the assumption A into evidence for the
conclusion B, as in the case of transforming the information that exp
evaluates to 0 into evidence that 0 equals exp.
In general, we know A⇒ B at least when we have a method that converts
hypothetical evidence x for A into evidence b(x) for B. We actually need
to know the method and be able to apply it. So let’s give that
transformation a name. We call it an operation, f , that transforms x into
f(x) in such a way that we know f(x) is evidence for B as long as we are
given real evidence for x, say a for A, if there is any. Notice, this
transformation f should work on hypothetical evidence. If this is part of
the way we really think and reason, then that operation f must be
effective in the sense that we can actually carry it out, either “in our
heads” or by doing some explicit computation, e.g. as in reducing an
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expression exp to 0. Here are some very simple examples.
We know (A⇒ (B ⇒ C))⇒ B ⇒ (A⇒ C). We can see this if we assume
that f is evidence for A⇒ (B ⇒ C), then if x is evidence for B, then
given y as hypothetical evidence for A, we see that f(y) is evidence for
B ⇒ C and f(y)(x) is evidence for C. We will see later how to put all this
together into a single function term.
We can now see why ⊥⇒⊥ is a proposition we know. We reason that no
matter what specific proposition ⊥ is, if we are given hypothetical evidence
x for the assumption, then the transformation that produces evidence for
the conclusion is the identity transformation, f(x) = x. We have exactly
the evidence needed to know the implication.
We will see shortly that it will be very convenient to have compact names
for specific operations such as the identity transformation. One notation
will be I for “Identity”. We also use the functional notation from
programming languages for this operation, λ(x.x).
We will start with this operational explanation of implication as one
meaning that we definitely use in mathematics and other areas of precise
thinking, as in science, to understand implication and its role in providing
evidence or information that causes us to accept an assertion because we
understand it and have the right kind of evidence for it. Let us see how
this explanation accounts for many of the laws typically expressed in the
Propositional Calculus such as these:
• A⇒ (B ⇒ A)
• (A⇒ B)⇒ ((A⇒ (B ⇒ C))⇒ (A⇒ C))
• (A⇒ B)⇒ ((B ⇒ C)⇒ (A⇒ C)).
Using our notation for operations, we see that λ(x.λ(y.x)) is evidence for
the first proposition. It is an operation that takes evidence x for A and
returns an operation λ(y.x) which takes evidence y for B and returns
evidence for A, namely x. This is a very clean and elegant explanation of
how we can come to know an implication without having specific evidence
for any of the constituent propositions, A, B, or C. This illustrates how
logic is capable of working with hypothetical information and transforming
it.
The operational explanation of
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(A⇒ B)⇒ ((A⇒ (B ⇒ C))⇒ (A⇒ C))
is the following operation
λ(f.λ(g.λ(x.g(x)(f(x))))).
What we have here is that f is hypothetical evidence for the assumption
A⇒ B, g is hypothetical evidence for (A⇒ (B ⇒ C)), and x is
hypothetical evidence for A. So we can see that g(x) is evidence for
(B ⇒ C) and f(x) is evidence for B. Therefore by reasoning about the
composition of the operations f and g, we see that g(x)(f(x)) is evidence
for C as required to have evidence for A⇒ C. If we imagine being given
concrete evidence for f and g, say f0 and g0, then λ(x.g0(f0(x))) is indeed
an operation that takes evidence for A into evidence for C.
We leave it as an exercise to find evidence for the last example.
These examples show us that in order to manipulate terms for evidence,
we should carefully develop the rules for applying operations. We also
recognize that these operations derive their meaning from knowing the
nature of the evidence they are transforming.
To understand the evidence semantics, we see that the evidence for a
proposition A can be thought of as data of a specific kind. Thus we borrow
a concept from one of the earliest investigations of logic, the work of
Bertrand Russell from 1908 [50, 49]. He defined a type as the range of
significance of a propositional function. Based on this idea applied to our
operational meaning of the logical operations from L.E.J. Brouwer in the
same time period [8, 33, 61], we use the term type to denote the collection
of terms that can be treated as evidence for a proposition A.
Shortly we will identify the notion of proposition with its semantics, with
the type of all the evidence for it in a systematic computational
interpretation of the kind we just used to explain implication.
As we progress in our understanding of logic, we will make more and more
precise the requirements on a type theory that make it a sufficient basis for
the semantics of the various logics studied in the literature on
mathematical logic. For the Propositional Calculus we will see that we
need a type theory that treats functions as objects and thus for any two
types, say T1 and T2, there will be the type of all effective operations
taking input from T1 into output in T2. This is the function type, denoted
T1 → T2, a standard type not only in mathematics but in modern
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programming languages. However, to call it a function type in the sense of
mathematics, we need to define an equality relation on the types, usually
denoted x =T y for equality on type T or also x = y in T . We will require
that the evidence operations respect the equality, and when they do we call
these operations functions.
Definition: Given two types T1 and T2, the type of all effective operations
from elements of T1 into elements of T2 is denoted Op{T1;T2} and is called
the type of effective operations from type T1 into type T2. If the operations
respect equality on the types, they are called effective functions from T1
into T2, denoted T1 → T2.
Notation: We denote elements of Op{T1;T2} and T1 → T2 by λ(x.b(x))
where if t is an element of type T1, then we know that b(t) is an element of
type T2. If f belongs to this type, then we denote its application to an
element t as f(t) which we regard as the display form of the underlying
primitive application term ap(f ; t).
Reduction rule: Given an operation λ(x.b(x)), the rule for reducing an
application ap(λ(x.b(x); t)) regardless of the types, is to substitute the
term t for x in b(x) to obtain b(t). For the moment we assume that the
term t is a data element and has no variables in it such as x. This is an
overly simple assumption as we will see later, and there are reasons for
substituting terms t which have free variables in them. When we do that
we must be very careful not to confuse the occurrences of variables because
that can change the meaning of the operation. Also in the more detailed
account below, we will not always indicate the body of the operation as a
term b(x) where we indicate the argument x of the function explicitly.
Instead we will use a notation for substitution such as b[t/x] meaning to
substitute the term t into the expression b for all free occurrences of the
variable x.
3.3 False Propositions and Negation
A simple extension of the minimal implication logic allows us to reason
about negation. We first consider the notion of a false proposition in the
setting of evidence semantics. Let us specialize the constant ⊥ to the
atomic proposition False. A false proposition is one for which there is no
evidence, so it’s evidence type should be empty. Let V oid be the empty
type, then [False] = V oid.
We denote this calculus as PC[False,⇒].
Once we have the False proposition, we can explain what it means that
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there is no evidence for a proposition P, by saying there is evidence for
P ⇒ False. That evidence would have the form λ(x.p(x)) where we know
that p(x) is evidence for False under the assumption that x is evidence for
P. If there were evidence for P , then λ(x.p(x)) would convert it to
evidence for False. But since there is no evidence for False, this means
there cannot be evidence for P either. Let us define the negation of a
proposition this way.
Definition: ∼ P means P ⇒ False.
We just used a very important bit of logical reasoning in our analysis of
∼ P . We said that if some proposition P implies the proposition Q, then if
we know ∼ Q, we must know ∼ P . This is called the contrapositive claim.
We can already express this in the new calculus with negation, we assert
that (P ⇒ Q)⇒ (∼ Q⇒∼ P ), and we can build the evidence for this as
follows. Let pq be hypothetical evidence for (P ⇒ Q), let nq be
hypothetical evidence for ∼ Q; this is an operation to provide evidence for
Q⇒ False. Now we need evidence for P ⇒ False which is an operation
from P to False. We build it from the other operations as:
λ(pq.λ(nq.λ(p.nq(pq(p))))).
This evidence expression captures the kind of informal logic that we used
in analyzing the nature of negation. The empty type and the proposition
False are useful more generally as well.
A subtle point about this small calculus arises in thinking about what it
should mean to assume False. What follows from this assumption? We
surely have False⇒ False since we have this for any constant including
⊥. We also have False⇒ True using the evidence λ(x.λ(y.y)), recalling
that True in this setting is False⇒ False.
Do we have False⇒ P for any proposition P? There can be no evidence
for False, so if we consider evidence of the form λ(x.x) can this be
evidence for False⇒ P? It is plausible to say that under the assumption
that there is evidence for False, we can prove anything, including that x is
evidence for P . In ancient logic this was the “ex falso quod libet” rule that
claimed from false anything follows. This simple question has been studied
and pondered a great deal, and one working conclusion is that it seems
that no great harm is done adopting this rule and using something simple
as evidence for P . We will return to this topic later, and in the meanwhile
allow a rule adopted in Constructive Type Theory (CTT) and
Intuitionistic Type Theory (ITT) that allows the following evidence term
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for this proposition, λ(x.any(x)).
Special Evidence: λ(x.any(x)) is evidence for False⇒ P .
We can now prove ∼ P ⇒ (P ⇒ Q).
Here are some facts that we know about negation:
• P ⇒∼∼ P
• (P ⇒ Q)⇒ (∼ Q⇒∼ P )
• (P ⇒∼ P )⇒ (P ⇒ Q).
Exercise: Is there evidence for (∼ (P ⇒ Q))⇒ (P ⇒∼ Q)?
3.4 Constructive semantics for classical PC
Now we define the semantics of the classical propositional calculus, PC,
using the constructive operators. We need an interpretation or model, M,
that assigns to the atomic propositions, A, an atomic type, M(A). For
compound propositions P , M(P ) is the type assigned according the
constructive semantics given above, the constructive meaning of P
according to the propositions as types semantics. This definition is precise
as it stands, but for increased clarity we spell out the separate clauses of
the definition as a review of the constructive semantics.
• if P is atomic, then {P} = {Unit|M(P )},
• {P&Q} = {Unit|M(P )×M(Q)},
• {P ∨Q} = {Unit|M(P ) +M(Q)},
• {P ⇒ Q} = {Unit|M(P )→M(Q)},
• {∼ P} = {Unit|M(P )→ V oid}.
Definition: We say that a formula P of PC is classically valid if and only
if {P} is an inhabited type, thus, ⋆ belongs to {P}.
This semantics is clearly constructive, being defined in a version of
constructive type theory. Using this semantics, we can validate the typical
axioms of PC and prove that the inference rules preserve this notion of
validity.
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Theorem 1: All the standard axioms given for PC are valid under
constructive evidence semantics for PC, and all the standard inference
rules preserve validity. Therefore all provable formulas of PC are
constructively valid.
The only interesting case is the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM), and we
have discussed this extensively above. We discuss it a bit further below.
This theorem requires the new Classical Introduction axiom of extended
constructive type theory, that ∼∼ P ⇒ {P}.
We also call this semantics virtually constructive evidence semantics
because the constructive meaning of the logical operators is hidden or
squashed or weak (from double negation), and is exposed only when
proving squashed propositions. This restriction is what keeps the theory
constructive.
The core of this new reasoning is the proof of {P ∨ ∼ P}, and that
depends critically on the constructive proof of ∼∼ (P ∨ ∼ P ). This
theorem tells us that we cannot ever construct any proposition P that we
know to be unknowable. This is quite a nice insight that cannot be
expressed so succinctly in classical logic. The constructive evidence for
∼∼ (P ∨ ∼ P ) turns out to be very interesting. In part, this is the case
because it does not depend on using False to express negation. It is a fact
that we can prove without the law ex falso quod libet, that from False one
can prove anything.
The following realizer shows that the formula ((P ∨ (P ⇒ A))⇒ A)⇒ A
is constructively true.
λ(h.h(inr(λ(p.h(inl(p)))))).
This is a realizer for the type
((P ∨ (P ⇒ A))⇒ A)⇒ A.
From this typing we see that the function h has the type
((P ∨ (P ⇒ A))⇒ A). It is also interesting that when we use arbitrary
propositions such as A, we can see that the argument is correct for
((P ∨ (P ⇒ A1))⇒ A2)⇒ A2 as long as we also know that A2 ⇒ A1. This
means that if A1 is V oid, then A2 must be V oid as well.
When A = False this expresses the Law of Excluded Middle. Here we see
that this is a more general fact. Friedman [23] was the first to significantly
exploit this insight.
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We discuss other aspects of this constructive semantics in the next section
that deal with first-order quantifiers.
Theorem 2: All constructively valid formulas of PC are provable.
This result is constructively true since we can prove the completeness
theorem constructively, there are several sources for this, e.g. [9].
3.5 Kolmogorov embedding
Kolmogorov [41] proposed and studied the following embedding of classical
PC into the intuitionistic version, iPC.
• K(P )→∼∼ P
• K(P&Q)→∼∼ (K(P )&K(Q))
• K(P ∨Q)→∼∼ (K(P ) ∨K(Q))
• K(P ⇒ Q)→∼∼ (K(P )⇒ K(Q)
• K(False)→ False20
Kolmogorov’s Theorem: If P is provable in classical PC, then we can
effectively transform any classical proof to a proof of K(P ) in intuitionistic
PC.
Applying the Kolmogorov transformation to a formula essentially doubles
its size. For example,
K(∼ (P&Q)⇒ False)
results in the formula
(∼∼ (∼∼ (∼∼ P& ∼∼ Q)⇒ False))
but in practice we could define classical versions of the logical operators,
say &
′
, ∨
′
, ⇒
′
and write the formulas this way (P&
′
Q)⇒
′
False.
Although this preserves the size of the original formula, the indirect
meaning provided by the translation is quite difficult to grasp intuitively.
By contrast, the semantic explanation we provide here is intuitive in that
it explicitly shows exactly what constructive information is available and
what is not.
20This captures that ∼∼ False is False.
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4 First-Order Logic
The situation for First-Order Logic (FOL) is similar to that for PC. We
can define {F} for FOL formulas using propositions as types and
refinement types. The results go over without much difficulty using a
standard constructive semantics for intuitionistic FOL (abbreviated iFOL).
One can see the details of this logic in Constructivism in Mathematics, An
Introduction [57] by Troelstra and van Dalen.
4.1 Constructive semantics for quantifiers
It is quite clear how to extend the ideas from PC to FOL. Here is the
definition of the classical modality for quantified formulas, we use the same
“squashing” mechanism as for PC.
• M({∀x.P (x)}) = {Unit|∀x.M(P (x))},
• M({∃x.P (x)}) = {Unit|∃x.M(P (x))}.
The interesting point here is that for the classical proposition,
∀x.(P (x) ∨ ∼ P (x)), we cannot establish {∀x.(P (x) ∨ ∼ P (x))} by
proving ∼∼ ∀x.(P (x) ∨ ∼ P (x)) since this double negation is not
constructively provable as we can see by using the notion of uniform
validity [13] or Kleene’s realizability semantics.
But all we need to establish is ∀x.{(P (x) ∨ ∼ P (x))}, which we can prove.
In this form, the proposition does not claim that we can expose the
decision made for each element of the domain, we simply use the fact that
for any such element d of the domain of discourse D, we know
{P (d) ∨ ∼ P (d)}.
Kleene [39] in Introduction to Meta-Mathematics, Theorem 63 on page 511
shows that the formula ∼∼ ∀x.(A(x) ∨ ∼ A(x)) is not realizable for
Heyting Arithmetic (constructive Peano Arithmetic) because
∼ ∀x.(A(x) ∨ ∼ A(x)) is realizable. This theorem arises from proving in
HA that we cannot solve the Halting Problem for partial recursive
functions. So now we see that there are indeed unsolvable problems of this
sort, not specific P or ∼ P questions for a definite assertion P , but rather
a claim about a class of problems Halt(i). We know from results of Turing
and Go¨del that such a class of problems can be unsolvable, hence the
defining formulas are not constructively provable.
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In the FOL case and for Peano Arithmetic (PA), we can seek to find the
weakest use of the squash modality to preserve computational meaning. It
is clear that if we apply the modality to the subformulas as well as at the
outer level, we will have a result such as ∀x.{P (x)∨ ∼ P (x)}.
Theorem 3: All the standard axioms given for FOL are valid under
constructive evidence semantics in which all subformulas are squashed.
Moreover, all the standard inference rules preserve validity. Therefore all
provable formulas of FOL are valid in the weak constructive semantics.
5 Mixed Mode Logics
It is possible in this context to blend constructive and classical logics and
rely on constructive type theory to provide the semantics. A similar mixed
mode can be defined with respect to the Kolmogorov embedding. The
semantics given here can provide a simple explanation for these mixed
mode assertions. For example, we might ask these kinds of questions.
(P ⇒ Q)⇒ {P ⇒ Q}?
This one is obvious, but what about this?
({P} ⇒ {Q})⇒ {P ⇒ Q}.
What about these formulas?
{P&Q} ⇒ {P}&{Q}?
{P}&{Q} ⇒ {P&Q}?
It interesting to mix the constructive and classical semantics. One of the
most natural ways to do this is to use our constructive semantics for
classical propositions. For example, consider the conjecture,
∼ ∀x.{P (x) ∨ ∼ P (x)}. What does this mean when D is N and P (i) is the
assertion Halt(i), saying that program φi with numerical index i halts on
input i, e.g. Halt(i)? We know ∼ ∀x.(Halt(x) ∨ ∼ Halt(x)) is consistent
with Heyting Arithmetic (HA), so we do not know
∼∼ ∀x : N.(Halt(x) ∨ ∼ Halt(x)) is not provable in iFOL. We know
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∀x : N.{Halt(x) ∨ ∼ Halt(x)}. We know in general that
∀x.{P (x) ∨ ∼ P (x)}.
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